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Deception is usually considered a bad thing. We teach our children not
to lie, we don't like it when our politicians dissemble, and we root against the
television character who misleads people. But we also officially permit
deception in all sorts of situations, including sports (Boise State's statue of
liberty play in the 2007 Fiesta Bowl), negotiations between lawyers (puffing
about the client's case), and scientific research (from whence the term
"placebo").
This Essay tries to figure out where in this spectrum deception by the
police, and more specifically police deception during interrogation, fits. I have
previously argued that police should not be able to practice deceit in their
official capacity, during interrogation or otherwise, unless (1) there is probable
cause to believe the person to whom they are lying is a criminal; (2) the lying
is necessary to obtain incriminating information; and (3) the lying does not
have an illegitimately coercive effect.' The first (probable cause) limitation
would curtail a significant amount of undercover work, pretextual seizures
and searches, and lies aimed at witnesses and mere suspects.2 But it would
also permit trickery during interrogation that follows an arrest, limited by the
second and third requirements.
Part I of this Essay revisits my earlier argument that probable cause
should be the threshold for authorizing deceptive practices and responds to
some criticisms of that position. The rest of this Essay fleshes out the second
and third limitations, something I neglected to do in my earlier work. Part II
directly addresses the necessity issue. It suggests, but admittedly does not
prove, that without police fraud a sizeable number of criminals would not
confess, and their cases would thus be much more difficult to solve. On that
assumption, Part HI describes a typology of deception that might be useful
during interrogation. It then identifies those situations within the typology

* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law;
Edwin A. Heafey Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
1. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR.
L. REv. 775, 778-88 (1997).
2. Id. at 801-12.
3. Id. at 812-15.
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where trickery becomes coercive, which addresses the third limitation. I
conclude that only two types of interrogation lying are clearly illegitimately
coercive: (1) lies aimed at convincing suspects that they do not have a right
to remain silent or a right to counsel and (2) lies that would be considered
illegitimately coercive if true, a principle that I call "the equivalency rule."
Part IV explains why concerns about false confessions do not change this
analysis. Finally, the concluding section of the Essay briefly considers
whether moral considerations require any other limitations on the use of
deception during interrogation, including whether we should make a
distinction between affirmative misrepresentations and failure to correct
misimpressions.
I. PROBABLE CAUSE AS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DECEPTION

In an article entitled Deceit, Pretext,and Trickery: InvestigativeLies by
the Police, I relied on the work of noted moral philosopher Sissela Bok in
constructing a framework for analyzing police deception.4 Bok argued that
lying is generally to be avoided because it coarsens the liar, denigrates the
dupe, and diminishes the level of trust in society as a whole.5 Bok was willing,
however, to recognize at least two narrow exceptions to this prohibition.6 The
first exception occurs when lying is necessary to avert a serious crisis, such as
in a hostage situation.7 The second arises when lying is necessary to protect
society from an enemy, a category in which Bok included criminals.8 Even in
these two situations, however, Bok demanded that, if at all possible, the public
-defined as a group representing diverse viewpoints, including potential
dupes-be involved in sanctioning the deception, given the ease with which
crises and enemies can be manufactured.9
In Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery I focused on the application of Bok's
enemy-criminal exception to police investigation and argued that, given the
difficulty of having a public debate about whether particular individuals fit that
exception, a judicial determination of criminality, either before or shortly after
arrest, should suffice.' ° In the interrogation context, this rule would prohibit
deception aimed at witnesses and others not in custody but would permit
necessary, non-coercive deception of persons who have been arrested, because
at that point a judicial determination of probable cause either has already been

4. Id., at 788-801 (discussing SiSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE INPUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
(Pantheon Books 1978)).
5. BOK, supra note 4, at 21-28.
6. Id. at 166.
7. Id.
at 140.
8. Id.at 135.
9. Id. at 152-53. Bok ultimately expresses doubt that the public can put itself in the enemy's shoes
and thus ends up being equivocal about the "lying to enemies" exception. Id.
10. See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 802-05.
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made or is imminently pending." I also argued that, once a person has been
formally charged, which usually occurs several days or weeks after arrest,
interrogation deception is no longer permissible because it should no longer
be deemed necessary, given the government's pronouncement, through the
formal charge, that the government has a prima facie case against the
defendant.12
Professors Robert Mosteller and Margaret Paris, in separate articles, have
both criticized this proposal to the extent it permits deception during
interrogation. 13 Both contend that, under Bok's framework and as an
independent normative matter, mere probable cause is an insufficient
justification for practicing deception, because arrestees are not necessarily
criminals.' 4 Both also register concern that lying during interrogation is
particularly pernicious and unacceptable when directed at someone charged
with a minor crime.' 5 Although these criticisms might argue for an adjustment
of my earlier position, they do not require its abandonment.
Mosteller and Paris are correct in asserting that Bok was particularly
concerned about the tendency of those who are contemplating deception to
reach self-serving conclusions about their dupes. 6 And, consistent with that
insight, research on the interrogation process verifies that the police are quite
capable of rationalizing their use of deceptive techniques by convincing
themselves that their interview subjects are guilty. 17 But ultimately Bok did
not stake out a clear position on when a person can be labeled an enemy.' 8 In
a passage referring specifically to criminals, she stated: "[Tihe more openly
and clearly the adversaries, such as criminals, can be pinpointed, and the more
justifiable, therefore, the criteria for regarding them as hostile, the more

11. Id. at 815-16.
12. Id. at 810-15. At the symposium at which this Essay was presented, I received several
comments to the effect that formal charging is an artificial dividing line, because the charging decision is
often based on little more than the information that justified the arrest and is pro forma in many jurisdictions.
That may be so, but the fact remains that a formal charge should represent a prosecutorial decision that a
prima facie case exists against the defendant and that, therefore, no further evidence is needed, as opposed
to desired. Cf. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction."); State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 305
(Utah 2001) (holding that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, evidence must be sufficient "to survive a
motion for directed verdict [but] need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt"). In any event, a prophylactic rule to this effect is warranted in this context.
13. Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR.
L. REV. 833 (1997); Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. L. REv. 817 (1997).
14. Mosteller, supra note 13, at 834; Paris, supra note 13, at 823.
15. Mosteller, supra note 13, at 844 n.45; Paris, supra note 13, at 831.
16. See BOK, supranote 4, at 146-53.
17. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 323-26.
18. For instance, in one passage Bok contemplated the use of unmarked police cars, which would
obviously deceive the innocent and the guilty alike even though police would not know which was which.
See BOK, supra note 4, at 99.

1278

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1275

excusable will it be to lie to them if honesty is of no avail.' 9 This language
suggests that Bok would permit some uncertainty as to the enemyhood of an
individual, provided the case for that status is made "openly and clearly," in
a manner that gives the dupe, as well as the public, notice of the dupe's status.
An arrest is an open and a clear statement that the state considers the
individual arrested to be a criminal suspect. While that declaration in any
given case is not the result of a public debate, it usually cannot be, for obvious
reasons. Of course, the public and the courts could debate in the abstract
whether and when police deception should be permitted. But, as I pointed out
in Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, any conclusions about the propriety of
particular deceitful techniques will vary widely depending on the perceived
guilt of the hypothetical dupe. For instance, I asked:
Should police be able to lie to someone about finding his fingerprints at the
scene of the crime to scare him into confessing? The answer might be yes if
he's arrested but no if investigators with few or no leads come to the person's
house and make the statement simply to see how he'll respond.2"

Given this relationship between acceptable use of deceit and the degree of
suspicion, the probable cause determination is not an unreasonable threshold
for permitting interrogation deception.
Professor Mosteller is also bothered, however, by the fact that a judicial
determination of probable cause rarely precedes an interrogation and that an
ex post judicial determination is likely to be infected by the results of the
interrogation.21 I anticipated this complaint in Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery,
where I noted:
[T]he police know that within forty-eight hours of arrest, [the arrest] will be
subject to a judicial check. Furthermore, the police know this check is
supposed to be based solely on prearrest facts (and not, for instance, on a
postarrest, deception-induced confession). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that if the police do not have probable cause at the time of arrest, their
subsequent questioning will be for naught.22

Nonetheless, Mosteller is right that police can manipulate facts based on what
they learn during the interrogation and, given their ability and willingness to
do so, might be encouraged by the rule I propose to arrest individuals illegally
in the hope that deception will subsequently help them make their case in front
of the judge. Thus, it might make sense--consistent with proposals designed

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 144.
Slobogin, supra note 1, at 803.
Mosteller, supra note 13, at 849-50.
Slobogin, supra note 1, at 811 (citation omitted).
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to regulate all interrogation, deceptive or not-to require interrogation
warrants, issued by judges on probable cause, before questioning that might
involve trickery takes place.23 To alleviate concerns about the effects of
trickery on those charged with very minor crimes, where the benefit may not
outweigh the harm visited by numerous betrayals of relatively law-abiding
citizens, issuance of such warrants might be restricted to investigations of
felonies. In those cases in which a warrant was not issued prior to arrest and
speed is of the essence, one could be sought relatively efficiently using the
telephonic warrant procedure now available in many jurisdictions.
This solution might mollify Professor Mosteller.24 But it would not allay
the concerns of Professor Paris who, following Bok, is particularly worried
about the harms produced by deception even in cases where the evidence of
guilt is great. For her, police deception is so likely to cause significant damage
to police-citizen relations that it should virtually never occur.25
In Deceit,Pretext,and Trickery, I explored in detail how police lying can
have a negative impact on dupes, police who lie, and police credibility more
generally.26 But if those harms are considered trump cards, as Professor Paris
appears to believe, then undercover work and electronic surveillance, among
many other deceptive investigative techniques, would have to be banned. In
any event, any damage that the use of interrogation trickery visits on the police
or on society should be minimal if lying is strictly confined to the post-arrest,
pre-formal charge interrogation context. And while suspects who are fooled
during such interrogations may well feel humiliated, the "harm" thereby
caused is far less palpable than other harms to suspects we routinely permit
upon a probable cause showing (I leave aside for now the harm of false
confessions that might be caused by deception). Solely on their own
determination of probable cause, law enforcement officials may detain
individuals for up to forty-eight hours.27 In emergency situations they may
also ransack homes looking for evidence. 28 And if a warrant is obtained,

23. See Russell D. Covery, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867,1879-91 (2005)
(arguing that interrogations are akin to Fourth Amendment searches); Timothy P. O'Neill, Rethinking
Miranda: Custodial Interrogation as a Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1109, 1123-24 (2004) (arguing that, when seeking to conduct interrogations, police need either consent, via
a Miranda waiver, or "proper authority" under the Fourth Amendment; if deception were seen as vitiating
consent, a warrant would be needed under this analysis).
24. It is not clear what Mosteller's ultimate position is on the use of interrogation deception. At one
point he suggests that deception be restricted to cases involving serious crime in which the suspect turns out
to be guilty, based on what he calls a "just deserts" rationale. See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 842-44. But
of course, guilt cannot be known at the time of interrogation. The probable cause requirement, bolstered
by the warrant requirement, is the only practical way of implementing this "just deserts" approach.
25. Paris, supra note 13, at 829-32 (concluding, after a description of the harms caused by police
lying in the interrogation context, that lying during interrogation is "unjustifiable").
26. Slobogin, supranote 1, at 796-801.
27. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
28. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) ("[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified by
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's escape,
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police are even permitted to use the ultimate deception technique-electronic
eavesdropping." If probable cause is sufficient to justify these types of
government actions, it should be enough to justify non-coercive deception
during interrogation.
Of course, even if the harms from post-arrest interrogation deception are
not as significant as Professors Mosteller and Paris seem to think, they might
still outweigh the benefits derived from the deception. In other words, lying
during interrogation may not be necessary, or only necessary in a few, unusual
cases. If that assumption is correct, then we need not bother debating about
interrogation deception.
II. THE NEED FOR DECEPTION DURING INTERROGATION
There is some dispute over whether any type of interrogation, deceptive
or not, is a necessary police tool. Paul Cassell, an avid supporter of the
interrogation process, conceded that confessions are essential in only some
22% of cases, and other analyses have produced even lower estimates. 30 But
most would probably agree that even if merely 5% of all prosecutions for
serious criminal acts require a confession, that proportion is sufficiently high
to warrant a continuation of the practice.
The more relevant statistic for present purposes is the extent to which
trickery is necessary to obtain confessions that are important to successful
prosecutions. Unfortunately, studies of the interrogation process produce
equivocal findings on this score. But the combined results of observational
studies, simulation research, and the conduct of the police themselves suggest
that a non-trivial number of guilty people would not confess in the absence of
investigative techniques that go beyond non-deceptive questioning.
Admittedly, most successful interrogations do not require specialized
techniques. Several studies conducted in the United Kingdom indicate that the
vast majority of confessions occur during the initial interview within a short
period of time. For instance, Baldwin found that in 600 run-of-the-mill cases
involving theft, burglary, and assault, confessions or admissions were obtained
during interviews that typically lasted fewer than thirty minutes. 3' Moreover,

or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.").
29. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1967).
30. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.Hayman, Police Interrogationin the 1990s: An EmpiricalStudy of
the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 906 (1996). See also Michael Wald et a, Interrogationsin
New Haven: The ImpactofMiranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1585-86, 1593-96 (1967) (finding that confessions
are important or essential in 13% of cases, although they are also occasionally crucial in clearing other
crimes and in discovering patterns of criminal activity); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick,
Miranda in Pittsburgh-A StatisticalStudy, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 23 (1967) (finding that confessions are
essential in less than 10% of cases).
31. John Baldwin, Police Interviewing Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?., 33 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 325, 327 n.28 (1993).
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Baldwin concluded that of those twenty suspects who confessed after at first
denying the charge, only nine did so because of the persuasive skills of the
examiner.3 2 Similarly, Pearse and Gudjonsson, in a second U.K. study, found
that only 3 out of 93 individuals who confessed did so after the initial
interview, with the rest providing incriminating statements during their first
meeting with the police in sessions that averaged twenty-two minutes. 33 They
further concluded that "psychological manipulation" was used in only 8% of
the 173 cases studied.34 Studies of American interrogations have found initial
denials to be more frequent, perhaps for cultural reasons or because of
Miranda v. Arizona, but nonetheless also indicate that many confessions are
obtained relatively quickly. 35 These kinds of findings suggest that, in the
typical case, deception plays little or no role in obtaining confessions because
suspects confess quickly (undoubtedly due, in many cases, to the
overwhelming evidence police already have against them).
When suspects insist on denying the charge beyond the first thirty
minutes, however, deceptive techniques may become crucial. For instance, in
the studies reported above, something beyond straightforward questioning was
necessary in 1.5% to 8% of the cases. Another U.K. study, conducted by
Gudjonsson, described twenty interrogations in cases involving rape, arson,
armed robbery, and murder, during which police used an array of deceptive
and other specialized techniques because the suspects were initially resistant
to making admissions.3 6 Unfortunately, the extent to which these observation
studies demonstrate the efficacy of deception is unclear, because the special
tactics may not really have been necessary. Furthermore, these studies do not
differentiate between various interrogation techniques, making an assessment
of deceitful practices difficult. For instance, in most of the cases involved in
Gudjonsson's 20-case study, the police, in addition to dissembling, browbeat
the suspect over long periods of time; indeed, in eight of the twenty cases the
confession was excluded on the ground that the questioning had been
"oppressive. '37 Nonetheless, "non-oppressive" techniques were clearly
important in over half of these cases.

32. Id. at 329 n..35.
33. John J. Pearse & Gisi H. Gudjonsson, Police Interviewing Techniques at Two South London
Police Stations, 3 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 63 (1996), reported in GUDJONSSON, infra note 36, at 77.
34. Id. at 112.
35. Barry Feld, Police Interrogationof Juveniles: An EmpiricalStudy of Policy and Practice, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 316 (2006) ("Police in this study concluded three-quarters of
interrogations in thirty minutes or less, and none exceeded one and one-half hours. These findings are
consistent with every other study of routine interrogation."); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 279 (1996) (finding that 35% of interrogations lasted less than
thirty minutes, and 71% lasted less than one hour).
36. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 86-87 (2003).
37. Id. at 112.
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The most comprehensive research on interrogations in the United States
arrived at similar results. Richard Leo observed 182 interrogations (60 by
videotape, the rest directly) conducted by three different American police
departments.3 8 A little over 64% of these interrogations produced either a full
confession or a partial admission. 39 Leo found that the two factors most likely
to produce a confession were the number of interrogation tactics the police
used and the length of the interrogation. 4° Leo also attempted to identify those
tactics that were the most and least successful. Among deceptive techniques,
the use of praise or flattery and offering moral justifications or psychological
excuses for the suspect's offense fell in the former category, whereas
confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt and minimizing the moral
seriousness of the offense ended up in the latter grouping (although the latter
two tactics were still somewhat helpful in obtaining confessions). 4, Ultimately
Leo's regression analysis could not definitively separate out the efficacy of
deceitful tactics from the efficacy of other techniques (such as pointing out
contradictions in the suspect's story or confronting him or her with evidence)
used during the same interrogation. 42 But Leo's data, like Gudjonsson's,
appear to show that in many cases some type of deception is important to
interrogative success.
Comparative analysis is another potential way of assessing the usefulness
of interrogation deception. The conclusions that can be drawn from this mode
of analysis, however, are highly ambiguous, given our current state of
knowledge. Gudjonsson asserts that the confession rate is higher in the United
Kingdom than in the United States, and that fewer deceptive and oppressive
tactics are used in the former country; based on these two assertions, he
suggests that such tactics may not be necessary.4 3 Yet both of Gudjonsson's
assumptions-that the confession rate is higher in the U.K. and that U.K.
police use fewer questionable practices-are suspect. 4 Furthermore, in
contrast to legal practice in the U.S., U.K. law permits police to continue

38.

Leo, supranote 35, at 272.

39.
40.

Id. at 280.
Id. at 292.

41.
Id. at 293, Table 14.
42. Id. at 300-01.
GUDJONNSON, supra note 36, at 620-23 (stating that, based on the English experience, fears
43.
among American police and courts that abandoning pressure and trickery would result in a significant

reduction in confessions "may be overstated").
44. The confession rate in the United Kingdom appears to be around 50% to 60%, see id. at 139,
which is similar to the rate found in American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 35, at 300-01 (stating
the confession rate in America is 64%); George C. Thomas Ill, Plain Talk About the Miranda Debate: A
"Steady State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv. 933,958 (1996) (finding a 52% to 55% confession
rate in the United States). As to the tactics used by English police, Gudjonnson's own work indicates that

in cases involving serious crimes, English police often resort to "American-style" tactics. GUDJONSSON,
supra note 36, at 114. See also IAN BRYAN, INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION: A STUDY OF PROGRESS,

PROCESS AND PRACrICE 4 (1997) (finding that reforms of the interrogation process in the United Kingdom
may have had limited impact on police behavior).
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questioning suspects even after they have indicated a desire to remain silent,
and police are allowed to tell suspects that their silence may be used against
them.45 If a confession rate differential between the two countries does exist,
these legal differences may explain all or most of it. Indeed, these differences
may provide U.K. police with such an advantage that American police need
deceptive practices merely to keep up.
The most direct support for the proposition that deception during
interrogation can be important comes not from studies of actual interrogations,
but rather from an innovative analogue study that attempted to simulate the
interrogation environment. Roussano and her colleagues solicited individuals
to participate in their experiment by telling them that they would be involved
in research comparing individual and group decision-making processes.4 The
participants were informed that they would be solving logic problems, some
alone and some with another individual who would be in the same small room
with them.47 Unbeknownst to the subjects, the person with whom they were
paired was a member of the experiment team. With some of the subjects, the
experiment team member asked for, and often received, help in solving one of
the logic problems that was supposed to be solved individually, while with
other subjects no attempt at rule8 violation occurred, thus creating a "guilty"
4
group and an "innocent" group.
After the testing was complete, all of the subjects, guilty and innocent,
were accused of improperly solving an individual logic problem as a pair. The
accused were then subjected to one of three interviewing conditions:
(1) pressure tactics (e.g., being told that a confession would settle the matter
quickly but that a denial would mean the professor would become involved
and things would get worse); (2) minimization tactics (e.g., empathizing with
the subject and minimizing the seriousness of the cheating); or (3) straightforward questioning. 49 Both of the specialized tactics, which could as easily
be based on lies as on an accurate statement of the subject's situation, vastly
increased the proportion of "confessions" from guilty subjects, from 46% in
the no-tactic condition, to 76% in the pressure condition, and to 81% in the

45. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: REPORT 56-57 (1993) (permitting continued
questioning after assertion of right to silence); Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, 1991, 10.4 (Eng.) (permitting the adverse use of silence caution).
After English police were required to give cautions, but before they could tell the interviewee that silence
could be used against them, the confession rate in the United Kingdom may have been 40-50%.
GUDJONSSON, supra note 36, at 324; Baldwin, supra note 31, at 335.
46. Melissa B. Roussano et al., InvestigatingTrue and FalseConfessionswith a Novel Experimental
Paradigm,16 PSYCHOL. Sc. 481 (2006).
47. Id. at 483.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
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minimization condition.5" As dramatic as these results are, however, they need
to be interpreted with caution, given the simulated nature of the research. 5'
A final type of data to consider in assessing whether deception is crucial
to the interrogation enterprise is the view of the police. If they show nothing
else about the use of deception during interrogation, the observational studies
reported above at least document that many police interrogators believe
trickery is a necessary tool if a confession is not quickly forthcoming. Indeed,
Leo claimed, based on his study of the interrogation process, that "modem
American interrogation is steeped in artifice, deception and fraud" because,
police interrogators believe, deception is the only way they can be effective
against those who do not want to talk. 52 Leo's conclusion is not surprising
given the fact that police training manuals openly subscribe to this point of
view.53
That police believe interrogation deception is necessary does not make
it so, of course. But the police do have the most experience at interrogation;
thus, the fact that they believe trickery is an essential mechanism for obtaining
confessions should count for something. Barred from using physically
intimidating tactics (as they should be), police may well be correct in their
surmise that many criminals who want to deny their involvement would not
confess without some degree of deception.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests, although it does not prove, that
deception is a necessary component of a successful interrogation in a subset
of cases where the suspect initially denies involvement in crime. Assuming
that is true, deception might generally be permissible if the police are stymied
using straightforward questioning, and if, as proposed in the previous section,
they limit its use to the post-arrest, pre-charge context.
That conclusion comes with two significant caveats, however. First, for
constitutional reasons, coercive deception and other deception that tends to
produce false confessions must be off-limits, even if it is considered necessary.
Second, even when necessary and non-coercive, some forms of deception
might be considered impermissible on moral grounds. I briefly address the
latter situation in the conclusion to this Essay. Below I discuss the issue of
coercion and false confessions.

50. Id. at 484, Table 1.
51. The specialized tactics also increased the number of confessions by innocent subjects, id.,
although, as discussed in the next section, that result is probably even more suspect from an external validity
standpoint.
52.
53.

RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JusTIcE 42 (forthcoming 2008).
See CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS xii (Fred E. Inbau et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004)

("We do approve, however, of psychological tactics and techniques that may involve trickery and deceit;
they are not only helpful but frequently indispensable in order to secure incriminating information from the
guilty or to obtain investigative leads from otherwise uncooperative witnesses or informants."). See also
id. at 236, 291, 323, 427-29 (defending trickery); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and
the Casefor Reconsideringthe Legality ofDeceptive InterrogationTechniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791,
808-18 (2006) (discussing leading interrogation manuals, all of which endorse trickery to some extent).
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111. WHEN TRICKERY IS COERCIVE
As just noted, one reason police think trickery is necessary during
interrogation is because, as a legal matter, they may no longer resort to
physical coercion. But coercion can be psychological as well as physical.
Thus, regardless of its effectiveness, some types of trickery may be barred by
the Constitution. Identification of these psychologically coercive techniques
is a difficult but crucial aspect of regulating interrogation. Rather than attempt
a comprehensive review of this issue, I will summarize the views of two
thoughtful scholars who have addressed it and then offer my own perspective.
Probably the best known analysis of the involuntariness concept in the
interrogation context comes from the late Welsh White, who addressed the
topic in several different works.54 Although Professor White acknowledged
that per se rules defining when a confession is voluntarily obtained are very
likely to be over- and under-inclusive, he believed the police and the courts
needed meaningful guidance on the topic, given the failure of the pre-Miranda
totality of the circumstances approach to confessions.55 He thus endeavored
to produce concrete prohibitions on "police conduct that is likely to rendera
resulting confession involuntary or to undermine the effect of required
56
Mirandawarnings or a suspect's independent right to an attorney.,
Operating from this baseline, White argued that the following techniques
(reorganized and augmented here for analytical convenience) should be
impermissible: (1) deception about whether interrogation is taking place
(including the use of "jail plants" and electronic eavesdropping of
conversations between co-suspects); (2) use of the "pretended friend"
technique (e.g., showing fake sympathy for the suspect or promising help
outside the legal system); (3) deception that minimizes the seriousness of the
charge or the crime (e.g., by suggesting that the crime was justified or
accidental); (4) lying about the strength of the case against the suspect (e.g.,
false statements that a co-defendant has inculpated the suspect, that the
suspect's fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime, or that the
suspect's polygraph examination indicates he is lying); (5) false promises of
lenient treatment by the legal system if the suspect confesses (i.e., what might
be called "pre-plea bargaining" 57 ); (6) false threats of physical or other serious
harm to the suspect or significant others; and (7) deception that suggests the
Miranda warnings are meaningless (e.g., suggestions that silence in the face

54. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581
(1979) (hereinafter Trickery); Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RuTGERS L.

REV.2001
55.
56.
57.

(1998).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 599-60 (emphasis in original).
LEO, supra note 52, at 29.
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of an accusation by a co-suspect can be used against the suspect).5 8 To White,
the first ploy undermines the right to an attorney; the second and third ploys
imply that incriminating statements will not be used against the suspect
(contrary to the second Miranda warning); and the final four ploys place an
impermissible amount of pressure on the suspect to confess.5 9
William Stuntz offers a contrasting view on the use of interrogation
trickery, focusing on whether the technique in question would confront the
guilty suspect with what he calls the "confession-or-perjury dilemma." 6 It
was this dilemma, Professor Stuntz suggests, that Miranda's right to silence
warning was designed to avoid, by providing guilty individuals with a third
option beyond making an incriminating statement or lying. 6' To Stuntz, only
those interrogation techniques that lead suspects to believe they do not have
the option of remaining silent are coercive.62 Threats of physical harm or lies
about the right to silence (i.e., scenarios (6) and (7) above) are clearly coercive
under this approach. In contrast, however, deception usually "avoids the
confession-or-perjury dilemma either by convincing the suspect that truthful
statements will not have incriminating consequences, or by making him forget
temporarily that they will. ' 63 Thus, to Stuntz, the first three ploys listed above
are clearly not coercive because they lead suspects to believe no ill
consequences will befall them if they talk.' The fourth and fifth ploys might
also be permissible under Stuntz's approach, so long as the warnings make
clear that remaining silent and requesting an attorney are options; if so, the
guilty suspect presented with overwhelming evidence or promised leniency
does not have to choose between confessing and lying.65
My tentative take on this issue differs from both scholars, although I am
closer to Stuntz than to White. I agree with White and Stuntz that a police
technique designed to convince a suspect that there is no right to remain silent
is coercive. That conclusion follows from Miranda's holding that, without
that right, custodial interrogation is inherently a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 66 Thus, leading a suspect to think that a failure to deny an
accusation can be used as evidence, as in ploy 7 above, is impermissible, as
would be any other statement by the police to the effect that silence can be
used against the suspect.
Most interrogation techniques, however, operate on the assumption that
the suspect has a right to remain silent and instead are aimed at convincing him

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

White, Trickery, supra note 54, at 602-28.
See id. at 603, 611, 614, 625, 633, 627, 609 (discussing each of the seven techniques).
William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 803 (1989).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 808-13, 817 (discussing the first three ploys).
Id. at 818.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966).
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or her that asserting the right is a bad idea. Many of these techniques clearly
exert pressure on suspects. But the legal question is whether that pressure is
a violation of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process Clause's prohibition
on involuntary statements.
My inclination, similar to Stuntz's, is to say that the only other types of
deceptive practices that should be considered unconstitutionally coercive are
those that would be unconstitutionally coercive if the statements made by the
police were true (a mode of analysis that might be called "the equivalency
rule"). A threat to beat a suspect who is not talking (i.e., scenario 6) is
impermissibly coercive, whether the threat is real or not. The same is true of
threats to prolong confinement until a confession is forthcoming, or
insinuations that a relative or close friend will be harmed if denials continue;
whether serious or fraudulent, these threats should be banned.6 7 In contrast,
the equivalency rule suggests that none of the first four ploys described above
is illegitimate. A conversation with a cellmate who is not a plant or with an
officer who is actually sympathetic (scenarios 1 and 2) is not coercive, and
deception about the motivation of the interrogator does not change that fact.
And while description of possible defenses or of the evidence against the
suspect (scenarios 3 and 4) does exert pressure on the suspect to provide
information, neither technique, when based on an honest assessment by the
officer, is impermissible on Fifth Amendment grounds, and thus neither should
be impermissible when the officer is lying about these matters. Deception
about the possible charges or the evidence does not accentuate the inherently
coercive nature of these techniques; indeed, these tactics probably exert more
pressure on the person who is told the truth than on the person who is
deceived.
More difficult to analyze under the equivalency rule are false promises
of leniency (scenario 5). Consider the practice described by David Simon in
his book Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets.68 According to Simon,
Baltimore detectives routinely tell the suspect that an invocation of rights will
only "make matters worse for him, for it would prevent his friend, the
detective, from writing up the case as manslaughter or perhaps even selfdefense, rather than first degree murder." 69 Simon averred that detectives also
said: "Once you up and call for that lawyer, son, we can't do a damn thing for
you.... Now's the time to speak up... because once I walk out of this room
any chance you have of telling your side of the story is gone."7 °

67. Paul Marcus, It's Not Just About Miranda: Determiningthe Voluntariness of Confessions in
Criminal Prosecutions,40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 619-21 (2006). Several cases hold that a threat to arrest
a relative is permissible if police may lawfully do so, but a majority of courts have held to the contrary. Id.
68. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (Ballantine Books 1991).
69. Id. at 195.
70. Id. at 194-95.
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Under the equivalency rule, qualms about this type of practice arise not
because of the possible deception involved; rather, they exist because even the
propriety of an honest promise of leniency is unclear. In Bram v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that a detective's suggestion to a suspect that
he would get a break if he confessed violated the Fifth Amendment. 7' The
Court explained in a subsequent opinion that in Bram, "even a mild promise
of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the
promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times
['alone and unrepresented by counsel'] are too sensitive to inducement and the
possible impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess."72 The
Court has since repudiated Bram,73 but lower courts continue to send mixed
signals about interrogation promises, whether sincere or sham, with many still
adhering to the principle that promises of any type are prohibited during
interrogation. 74 For instance, after noting that "[t]he California Supreme Court
has never distinguished between promises of leniency based on whether the
promises were kept," the court in People v. Vasila explained:
The issue is not whether a commitment was honored, but rather whether
governmental agents have coerced a citizen to give testimony against himself.
When the government does so, it deprives that citizen of a right assured to
him by the Fifth Amendment. Whether the coercion is based on a promise
kept or repudiated can only truly be tested in hindsight, but it constitutes
coercion under either scenario.75
Vasila is correct that all promises of leniency should be viewed as
impermissibly coercive. Professor White tried to distinguish between kept and
unkept promises by arguing that lying about the prospects for leniency during
interrogation could be equated with a prosecutor's failure to abide by a plea
agreement, 76 which the Supreme Court held to be a violation of due process in
Santobello v. New York.77 But Santobello is probably best explained by the
Court's desire to ensure that plea bargaining works. Defense attorneys, as
repeat players, will be unwilling to negotiate if prosecutors can renege with
impunity on any agreement reached. The same type of reasoning does not
apply to most suspects subjected to interrogation.

71. Bran v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) ("But a confession, in order to be
admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.")
(quoting 3 H. SMrrH & A. KEEP, RUSsELL ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
72. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
73. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
74. See Marcus, supranote 67, at 621-22.
75. People v. Vasila, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 360-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
76. Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises,43 DUKE L.J. 947,96474 (1994).
77. Santobelo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
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As Vasila recognized, the crucial question should not be whether a
promise is broken but whether any promise, true or false, is coercive under the
Fifth Amendment. The argument that it is rests on the two leading Fifth
Amendment interrogation cases. As Brain recognized, forcing a suspect to
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of what is, in essence, a plea offer, by
implying or explicitly stating that calling in an attorney to help with the
decision will shut the door on any possibility of a deal, trenches not only on
the right to remain silent, but also on the right to counsel, which Miranda held
was an essential element of implementing the Fifth Amendment in
interrogation cases.7 8

For that reason, this particular coercive practice

probably should be prohibited, whether the offer is legitimate or not.
IV. DECEPTION AND FALSE CONFESSIONS

Some might believe that this discussion of coercion misses the point.
Many commentators, for example, have argued that any discussion of which
interrogation practices are permissible should be influenced, if not driven, by
their potential for producing false confessions. Thus, Professor White called
for prohibitions on (1) lengthy interrogations, (2) interrogations of vulnerable
suspects such as minors or people with disabilities, and (3) interrogations
involving threats, promises, and certain types of deception, because these
techniques have figured prominently in confession cases where the defendant
was eventually exonerated.79 Others have promoted outright bans on all types
of deception out of fear it will induce innocent people to confess.8
As White himself admitted, however, the false confession rationale for
barring prolonged questioning or questioning of particularly vulnerable
individuals is much stronger than it is for prohibiting deception. 8 ' The only
plausible evidence that deception, by itself, causes false confessions comes
from the previously mentioned study conducted by Roussano and colleagues,
which found that 14% of the innocent participants who were offered a deal and
18% of the innocent participants who were subjected to minimization tactics
ended up confessing. 82 As explained earlier, however, findings from such
simulation research need to be taken with a grain of salt. The consequences
78. "Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, 'all the
careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness,
would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a
confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."' Miranda, 384
U.S. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
79. WELSH S. WHTrE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
AFTER DICKERSON 190-95, 201-14 (2001) [hereinafter WANING PROTECTIONS]; see also Welsh S. White,
False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-

C.L. L. REv. 105, 110, 142-55 (1997).
80. See, e.g., Paris, supra note 13, at 826; Gohara, supra note 53, at 795.
81. See WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 79, at 190-95, 201-14.
82.

See Roussano, supra note 46, at 484.
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of confessing in the Roussano study were minimal (a possible charge of
cheating on a non-graded experiment); indeed, 6% of the innocent subjects
confessed even though they were not subject to any specialized interrogation
technique, suggesting that many of the participants were not particularly
concerned about incriminating themselves.83 Studies of actual interrogations
are much more equivocal about the impact of deceptive techniques. After
looking at the available research on why and how often innocent people
confess, Professor Laurie Magid, for one, concluded that "the studies on false
confessions fail to prove, or even strongly to suggest, that a significant number
of persons have been wrongly convicted because of false confessions obtained
by police using deceptive interrogation techniques. '
Professors Ofshe and Leo have stated that there are "numerous
documented cases" in which custodial suspects confessed to crimes they did
not commit in response to psychological interrogation techniques. 85 But the
absolute number of such false confessions is small.8 6 Furthermore, Ofshe and
Leo's own research, as well as the research of others, confirms that deception,
by itself, is rarely the cause of false confessions; usually, deception must be
combined with a lengthy interrogation during which the police convince the
suspect that a confession is the only way to escape an intolerably stressful
situation. 87 This research suggests that long, drawn-out interrogation should be

83. Id. at 483-484. Cf Robert Horselenberg etal., False Confessions in the Lab: Do Plausibility
and Consequences Matter?, 12 PSYCHOL., CRIME, & L. 61 (2006) (finding that increasing the potential
consequences of a confession in simulation research dramatically reduced the rate of false confessions).
84. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police InterrogationPractices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1168, 1194 (2001).
85. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using Miranda to Scapegoat the Innocent: Another Reply
to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. &CRMINOLoGY 557, 567 (1998).
86. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivationsof
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 473 (1998). Leo and Ofshe claimed to have discovered sixty such cases, resulting from
a wide range of interrogation techniques, although in thirty-one of the cases the inaccuracy of the confession
was discovered before trial. Id. Other studies have reported additional false confession cases, perhaps
amounting to a total of 200 over several decades. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of
False Confessions in a Post-DNA World, 85 N.C. L. REv. 891 (2004).
87. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory
and Classificationof True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L., POL. & SOC. 189, 212 (1997) ("[E]liciting
a false confession takes strong incentives, intense pressure and prolonged questioning."); Saul M. Kassin
& Gisi Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literatureand Issues, 5 PSYCHOL.
SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 60 (2004) (referring to a 2004 study that found that the average length of interrogation
leading to false confession was 16.3 hours); Welsh S. White, Confessions in CapitalCases, 4 U. lIL. L. REV.
979, 1021 (2003) ("[I]n fifteen of the sixteen proven or probable false confession cases in which Leo and
Ofshe specify the length of the interrogation, the police interrogated the suspect for more than six hours");
Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain PerniciousInterrogation Tactics, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211,
1235, 1243 (2001) (admitting that minimal promises of benefit and exaggerating strength of the evidence
are unlikely to lead to false confessions). See also WANING PROTECIONS, supra note 79, at 213 (telling a
suspect that he or she failed a polygraph is unlikely to cause a false confession because the suspect is likely
to believe the test is wrong).
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prohibited as impermissibly coercive, but it says little about the impact of
deception during shorter interrogation sessions.
Similarly, false confessions from youth and people with mental
retardation appear to result from the inherent vulnerability of these people to
suggestive techniques, not from deception per se. Research indicates that
leading questions based on the actualevidence and sincere assertions about its
strength are as likely as fraudulent tactics to cause a false confession from
these types of people.88 Indeed, one simulation study found that all of the
variance in false confessions stemmed from individual traits, not deceptive
techniques. 89 Perhaps for that reason, as White suggested, interrogation of
particularly vulnerable groups should be banned or subject to particularly
rigorous review. But a prohibition on deception in all interrogations would be
an overreaction to the suggestiveness of a small subset of people subject to
interrogation. 9°
V. CONCLUSION: MORAL AND IMMORAL LYING

I have argued that police deceit during interrogation is permissible when:
(1) it takes place in the window between arrest and formal charging; (2) it is
necessary (i.e., non-deceptive techniques have failed); (3) it is not coercive
(i.e., avoids undermining the rights to silence and counsel and would not be
considered impermissibly coercive if true); and (4) it does not take advantage
of vulnerable populations (i.e., suspects who are young, have mental
retardation, or have been subjected to prolonged interrogation). A prohibition
of interrogation deception under these conditions would cause much more
harm (in terms of lost true confessions) than benefit (in terms of preventing
false confessions and any intangible harm to the dupe or society).
Even if one accepts these conclusions as a general matter, however, a
Bokian debate may ultimately place further limitations on interrogation deceit.
For instance, as I noted in Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, debate about
88. See P.A. Register & John F. Kihstrom, Hypnosis and Interrogative Suggestibility, 9
PERSONALrrY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 549 (1988) (finding that suggestible individuals alter their
responses even when no negative or misleading feedback is given; the mere fact of leading or repeated
questions causes them to give inconsistent answers); C.P. Linton & Peter W. Sheehan, The Relationship

Between Interrogative Suggestibility and Susceptibility to Hypnosis, 22 AUSTRALIAN J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 53 (1994) (same). See also BRYAN TULLY & DAVID CAHMLL, POLICE
INTERVIEWING OF MENTALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 11 (1984) (finding that

suggestible individuals produced inaccurate information even when interviewed by police who, because they
knew they were being taped as part of an experiment, presumably did not try to lead or mislead the subjects).
These three studies are reported in GUDJONSSON, supranote 36, at 362, 404.
89.

J.P. Blair, The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differences in Producing

Compliant False Confessions, 13 PYSCH., CRIME, & L. 173, 183-84 (2006) (finding, based on a study
involving 143 students, that "individual differences were important in explaining false confessions" but that
"[t]he false evidence induction did not.., cause more false confessions to occur," and that "the min/max
induction did not ... increase the number of false confessions").
90. See WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 79, at 110.
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appropriate practices might well declare off-limits certain particularly dramatic
ruses, such as a police officer posing as a court-appointed lawyer, clergy
person or psychiatrist, regardless of whether such a technique is considered
necessary or "coercive."'" And even courts that have generally been tolerant
of deception have prohibited officers from manufacturing physical evidence
(a tactic that would not be coercive under the equivalency rule).92 Perhaps
consensus might develop around a even more general principle: A prohibition
on all affirmative misrepresentations about evidence against the accused or
about police motivation (which would still permit failures to correct
misimpressions about these issues). This dividing line would justify all but
one of the Supreme Court's cases 3 and has been adopted in some European
countries. 94 It also informs the code of ethics governing lawyers, apparently
on the theory that the adversarial nature of the legal process obligates the
parties to discover relevant facts rather than have them handed to them (thus
the authority to leave misimpressions uncorrected), but that adversariness
should only be carried so far (thus the prohibition on lying).9 5 Accordingly,
even if affirmative misrepresentations are necessary to obtain confessions in
some cases and are not coercive, we may decide that all such misrepresentations, or some subset of them, are too morally repugnant to permit their
occurrence.
In the meantime, however, interrogation deception should be permitted
under the conditions I have suggested.

91. Slobogin,supra note 1, at 813.
92. See, e.g., State v. Cayward, 552 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he
manufacturing of false documents by police officials offends our traditional notions of due process ...").
93. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (admitting verbal admissions made by a
suspect who believed that unwritten statements could not be used in evidence); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U.S. 523 (1987) (reaching the same conclusion); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (admitting
statements about a homicide by a suspect who believed the police were only going to ask questions about
a firearms crime). But see Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,739 (1969) (admitting statements made by suspect
who was told, falsely, that his co-defendant had confessed). See also Mathiason v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 492
(1977). In Mathiasonthe Court noted that the officer had lied about finding the defendant's fingerprints at
the scene of the crime and then stated "whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it
has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Mirandarule." Id. at 495.
94. Thomas Weigend, Germany Rules of Criminal Procedure, in CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMAINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 202-04 (1999) (recounting German rules that bar affirmative
misrepresentations and failures to clear up misimpressions about the law, but not misimpressions about other
matters).
95. Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "a lawyer shall not knowingly
...make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr
R. 4.1 (2002). But the first comment to that rule states: "A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing
with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts." Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.

